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pAbstract: Do international university rankings or professional accreditations affect
the preferences of exchange students over different institutions? This paper
investigates the question by analysing the determinants of Maastricht University
School of Business and Economics (SBE) students’ choices of possible destinations
for their compulsory period of study abroad. The unique dataset used includes
2,970 applications for studying abroad between academic years 2004/2005 and
2008/2009, and 152 partner institutions across the world among which students
can choose. A model is developed and estimated by means of the probit model.
The results indicate that international rankings (the THESR) and business school
accreditations (AACSB and EQUIS) are important for exchange students with high
academic achievement, even after taking university fixed-effects into account.
However, the estimated effect is small or even negative for students with lower
academic achievement. As suggested by previous literature, also other
characteristics of the university location (e.g. distance from the equator) affect
students’ choices.
JEL codes: I23 – C35
Keywords: International students; Higher education institutions; Rankings;
Accreditations; Student choice1. Introduction
When choosing a destination for a period of study abroad, students are expected to
take a number of factors into consideration, such as price levels, climate, and the
quality of the education. This paper investigates the role of these factors in students’
choices, with a particular focus on education quality. As measures (or proxies) of
quality the Times Higher Education Supplement Ranking (THESR) and the most
wide-spread professional business schools accreditations (Association to Advance
Collegiate Schools of Business, AACSB, and European Quality Improvement System,
EQUIS) are used. This analysis investigates whether these measures affect prospective
exchange students’ choice of potential destinations. Accredited or well-ranked univer-
sities are expected to be preferred by students. This holds true if the student values
the quality of education during her stay abroad, and if accreditations and rankings
are a proxy for quality. Furthermore, there might be a causal effect: if the information
about the potential host institutions available to students is incomplete, rankings and
accreditations may work as a signal for quality. Besides quality of education, this2013 Marconi; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
icense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
rovided the original work is properly cited.
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dents’ choices.
International student mobility is of great interest to policy-makers, especially in
Europe, because it is thought to foster, among other desired outcomes, labour mobil-
ity, the creation of a common labour market, cultural integration, and the creation of
class of leaders at a European level (Ritzen, 2010; European Commission, 2009). Qual-
ity assurance in higher education is considered a crucial aspect to be improved at a
European level to foster student mobility (European Commission, 2006). If existing
measures of quality are considered reliable by mobile students, they can be used as a
tool to foster mobility. Ritzen (2010) argues that Europe-wide accreditation by inter-
national professional organisations is a key step to improve quality assurance and
reach appropriate levels of student mobility. The fact that quality differentials are a
major determinant of international student mobility is well established in the litera-
ture on international students mobility (e.g. McMahon, 1992; Kelo, 2006; Thissen and
Ederveen, 2006). However, how to adequately signal the quality of the education pro-
vided at different institutions remains an unresolved issue for education managers
and policy-makers. As accreditations are expensive both in terms of time and monet-
ary costs, it is crucial for education managers to understand whether they are actually
considered a valuable signal by their stakeholders. Policy-makers and university man-
agers should know whether students actually take rankings and accreditations into
consideration.
The data used in this paper has been made available by Maastricht University
School of Business and Economics (SBE), a large Dutch business school with more
than 3,000 students. From administrative records, it is possible to identify SBE’s part-
ner institutions and the preferences of the prospective exchange undergraduate stu-
dents over these institutions. The sample covers the period from the academic year
2004/2005 to 2008/2009, 152 universities, and 2,970 exchange applications. SBE’s data
is particularly suitable for the purposes of this study, as the faculty prides itself on a
strong international orientation, and its students can choose among a diverse set of
host institutions. Furthermore, the exchange period is compulsory for SBE students,
so that it is possible to analyse the full population of prospective exchange students.
On the other hand, generalising the results is difficult, as the data is based on only
one institution.
In order to link the data to an estimation strategy, a model of whether a univer-
sity is chosen by a particular student has been developed. Subsequently the appro-
priate variables to be included in the estimation on the basis of this model were
identified. Finally, the model has been estimated using an ordinary probit model
with and without university fixed-effects. The results suggest that the THESR rank
has a causal effect on the choices of exchange students with high academic
achievement. The number of accreditations also appears to have a large impact at
the top of students’ distribution, but the estimated coefficient is not significant
when university fixed-effects are taken into account. The effect of the THESR and
of accreditations is small for the median student, and it is negative for students
with lower-than-average academic achievement. Other variables, such as gross na-
tional income (GNI) per capita or distance from the equator, appear to affect the
preferences of exchange students as well. These results are consistent with the
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2004; Rodriguez-Gonzalez et al., 2011).
This paper is organised as follows. The next section reviews the literature on student
choice and international exchange students; Section 3 describes the application process
at SBE and the data; Section 4 develops the model and the empirical strategy; Section 5
presents the results; the last section concludes.
2. Literature review
To the knowledge of the author, this study is the first to analyse the determinants of
exchange students’ choice of institutions in other countries. The effect of university
rankings on student choice has received some attention, but mostly in a national con-
text. In general, it has not been determined yet whether rankings and accreditations in-
fluence the decisions of prospective students to apply to a given university. On the a
whole, the literature on the flows of exchange students indicates that factors related to
both, quality of education and other characteristics of the destination, play a role in stu-
dents’ decisions.
Prospective exchange students are enrolled at a university in a given country, and
decide to spend a period of study (usually one semester) outside that country, at an
institution linked to their home university through a partnership agreement (McInnis
et al., 2004). Exchange students are likely to value the academic quality of the host in-
stitution. After all, they obtain a considerable part of their education (usually, one se-
mester of six) at the host institution, and the exchange experience is expected to
improve their skills and career prospects considerably (e.g. Bracht et al., 2006;
Teichler and Janson, 2007). In addition, the returns to one year of education have
been found to be higher for students attending prestigious colleges in the US (e.g.
Brewer et al., 1999; Black and Smith, 2004). If rankings and accreditations are corre-
lated with university quality, then we should observe that exchange students choose
well-ranked or accredited universities more often. Furthermore, a causal effect is
expected, as it is not easy for students to acquire information about the quality stan-
dards of foreign universities and university systems. Hence, accreditations and rank-
ings could work as a signal for institutional quality.
Accreditations and rankings are both intended to signal the quality of the services of-
fered by a university, but they work differently. A ranking on one hand consists of a
contemporaneous analysis of a set of universities based on summary statistics. As such,
they have been often criticised (see e.g. Marginson, 2007, for a critique of the THESR
methodology; Saisana et al. 2011, for an evaluation on the reliability of different inter-
national rankings). However, they have an enormous impact in the landscape of higher
education (Hazelkorn, 2008). On the other hand, an accreditation consists of “an evalu-
ation of whether an institution qualifies for a certain status” (Woodhouse, 1999, p. 33).
This evaluation is awarded after an in-depth analysis of a single institution and aims to
establish: whether its objectives are appropriate; whether its plans are suitable to
achieve the objectives; whether actions conform with the plans and whether they are ef-
fective; what is the measure of the objective (Lock, 1999; Woodhouse, 1999). The value
of accreditations as an indicator of quality has been less controversial. Sciglimpaglia
et al. (2005) gives an overview of the history of professional accreditations in the field
of business education, noting their increasing relevance within the academic world.
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extensive. Many papers focus on the effect of tuition fees or distance from the closest
college as determinants of students’ choices (e.g. Soo and Elliott, 2010; Gibbons and
Vignoles, 2012). Some works (e.g. Monks and Ehrenberg, 1999; Kong and Veall,
2002) investigate the relationship between a university’s position in national rankings
and students’ applications to the university. These studies do not analyse the individ-
ual student choice, but the impact of rankings on measures such as the number of ap-
plicants to the institution or the average Scholastic Assessment Test (SAT) score of
the students admitted to an institution. The results are contradictory. Drewes and
Michael (2006) investigate the role of rankings in determining the choices of pro-
spective students to apply to the 17 universities of the province of Ontario, Canada.
They use a dataset that is very similar to the one used for this paper; they look at the
application forms of prospective students who may choose a number of universities
they would like to attend. They find mixed results: rankings appear to affect the prob-
ability of students choosing a university only in some fields of study, and in different
ways. Only a few studies address the existence of a relationship between students’
preferences and the position of a university in either of the two main worldwide rank-
ings, the THESR and the Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU), or
the status regarding one of the three main professional accreditations for business
education, the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB), the
European Quality Improvement System (EQUIS), and the Association of MBA
(AMBA). Montgomery (2002), for example, includes the AACSB accreditation as a
control variable in his empirical model of college choice. He uses a nested logit model
to model the probability that a prospective student decides for a given business school
or to look for a job instead. He finds that the level of accreditation is correlated with
the probability of the student choosing the university, but he neither comments on
the result, nor investigates whether the relationship could be causal. On the contrary,
Elliott (2012), who analyses the effect of tuition fees on the number of applications
controlling for accreditations, finds no impact of accreditations on international stu-
dents’ applications to British schools of business. In general, studies analysing the in-
dividual choice between universities have remained in the context of one country (for
example, the aforementioned studies for the US, UK or Canada; or Oosterbeek et al.,
1992, for the Netherlands). Therefore, it is an advantage of the data used in this paper
that it allows to investigate the choices of a population of students across an inter-
national sample of universities.
Most of the studies on exchange students have focussed on Europe and, more specif-
ically, on the ERASMUS Programme. The first studies appeared shortly after the inaug-
uration of the Erasmus programme (e.g. Burn et al., 1990). Studies of the determinants
of the choice of Erasmus students have usually made use of surveys and have focussed
mainly on why students undertake a study period abroad, rather than on why they
chose a particular university. For example, Teichler (2004, p. 397) reports some survey
statistics and concludes that “students expect […] academic, cultural, linguistic and
professional benefits, but […] combining them with an interesting extracurricular life
during the period spent abroad”. Rodriguez-Gonzalez et al. (2011) is perhaps the first
study to examine the determinants of exchange (ERASMUS) students’ choices of pos-
sible destinations in other countries, but they look at aggregate country flows. They
Marconi IZA Journal of European Labor Studies 2013, 2:5 Page 5 of 22
http://www.izajoels.com/content/2/1/5find results broadly consistent with Teichler (2004): students seem to choose univer-
sities in countries with good educational systems (as measured by the proportion of
universities listed in the ARWU top 200 universities), but also destinations with pleas-
ant climate and touristic appeal (such as the Mediterranean countries). Price levels in
the host country also appear to be taken into consideration by exchange students.
Based on the results of their survey, Llewellyn-Smith and McCabe (2008) addressed the
determinants of exchange students’ destination choices, but focussed on students
studying in Australia and on aspects other than the impact of international indicators
for university quality. Their study confirms that factors such as cost of living or culture
are important determinants of these choices.
3. Data
Application process for an exchange period at SBE
This paper uses data on the preferences of SBE students applying for a compulsory ex-
change period abroad. At SBE a study period abroad has been compulsory for all bach-
elor programmes since 2001. Around 600 students take part in exchanges every year,
generating a total of 2,970 applications during the observation period, from the aca-
demic year 2004/2005 to 2008/2009. The application procedure that students have to
comply with has changed over the years, but has maintained a number of common fea-
tures. Firstly, the International Relations Office (IRO) of the faculty compiles a merit-
based ranking of the students, based on the grade point average (GPA) and on other
factors like the number of credits obtained by the student and the study programme
which she is enrolled in. The students with the highest academic achievement top the
IRO’s ranking. As the second step, students fill in an application form, in which they
are asked to indicate six partner institutions where they would particularly like to study.
Then, students are allocated one of the partner institutions that they have listed in their
application form by the IRO. Places are allocated based on availability after higher-
ranked students have already been allocated a place. It follows that the highest-ranked
student is sent to her favourite institution. The second-ranked is allocated to her
favourite institution if the available places for that institution have not been exhausted
after allocating the first student (this would happen if there is only one place available
at the desired institution, and the best-ranked student had already been allocated to it).
Otherwise, she is allocated to the destination indicated as her second choice. This
process is repeated until the lowest-ranked applicant has been allocated to her highest
available preference. If none of the six universities indicated by the student are avail-
able, the student is assigned to one of the universities which still have available places
available after all other students have been allocated. Students can apply during two dif-
ferent sessions within the academic year, fall semester and spring semester, according
to the semester in which they would like to go on exchange. These sessions (in which
students have the option to apply) are called “application sessions”. There are ten dif-
ferent application sessions in the sample used for this paper (spring and fall semester of
five academic years).
Dataset
For each applicant, the following information is available: the preferred partner institu-
tions as expressed on her application form; the position in the student ranking
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able places for each year and potential grade requirements; and the institution to which
the student was eventually allocated by the IRO.
The dataset is organised as a cross-section of student-university combinations. This
generates a large number of observations, 306,580 (the sum of the universities avail-
able to every single student). The dependent variable of the empirical model is a
dummy variable which takes the value 1 for combination ij if university j has been in-
dicated by student i among her favourite 6 destinations; and 0 otherwise (this variable
is called C). For each student, the rank in the IRO ranking is known. This variable is
standardised by dividing it by the total number of applicants in the respective applica-
tion session; the new, standardised variable is called relrank. A set of university-
specific variables (“strategic characteristics”), which depend on the relationship
between the partner institution and SBE, was collected from the IRO files. These vari-
ables are the number of available places that the partner institution makes available to
SBE students (avp), a variable indicating whether the GPA of the student is insuffi-
cient for admission at the host institution1 (labelled graderequisite), and whether or
not a partner appears for the first time on the list of partners (new – this variable has
been generated because new partners may be chosen less frequently because students
did not have the opportunity to learn from the past experience of friends and
colleagues).
A number of other university-specific variables have been collected from a number
of sources. The position in the THES ranking (thes) was taken from the published
rankings (Times Higher Education Supplement 2010)2. The accreditation status of
each university in each year was obtained from AACSB (2010, private email), and
from the websites of partner universities for EQUIS. Other variables were collected
from various sources (number of students, year of foundation, etc.), the location (lati-
tude, population of host town, whether it is close to the coast, etc.) and the socio-
economic situation in the countries (price levels, number of internet users per 1,000
inhabitants, etc.). Most of these variables were collected for one year of reference and
thus do not vary over time.3 All the variables used, and related sources can be seen in
Table 5, within Appendix 1.
The sample comprises 152 universities, and is very diverse. Table 1 shows the num-
ber of institutions of every region of the world represented in the sample in the first
and last year of the analysed period. It also shows the share of universities which were
accredited by AACSB or EQUIS. The table shows that many different geographical
areas are represented and that a substantial, increasing number of partners is
accredited by one of the two organisations. This is paramount for this study, as varia-
tions over time for the same university are crucial in the empirical estimations. How-
ever, there are two sources of variations over time in the number of accredited
institutions. One source is the inclusion of partner universities that had already been
accredited when they became partners of SBE. This increases the variation over time,
but not within universities. The other source is the accreditation of institutions that
were partners of SBE when they received the accreditation. This type of within-
university variation is exploited in the empirical part of the paper. 15 universities re-
ceived an accreditation while they were SBE partners (about 10% of the sample). The
remaining variation in the proportion of accredited universities is due to the inclusion
Table 1 Number of partner institutions and % accredited, by region
Academic year 2004/2005 Academic year 2008/2009
Region % accr. % ranked Partners % accr. % ranked Partners
Central Europe 23.33% 20.00% 30 52.00% 20.00% 25
Eastern Europe 0.00% 0.00% 5 0.00% 0.00% 5
Mediterranean Europe 13.64% 9.09% 22 26.32% 0.05% 19
Northern Europe 54.55% 27.27% 11 62.50% 25% 8
UK-Ireland 50.00% 50.00% 2 66.67% 66.67% 3
AUS-NZ-SA 80.00% 40.00% 5 50.00% 60.00% 10
North America 71.43% 14.29% 14 87.50% 58.33% 24
Latin America 20.00% 0.00% 5 42.86% 28.57% 7
Asia-Pacific 40.00% 40.00% 10 40.00% 46.67% 15
Total 34.62% 19.23% 104 51.72% 33.62% 116
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200 institutions in the world by the THESR is also relatively high and increasing, but
it is lower than the share of accredited partners. However, within-university variation
of this measure is more substantial than for accreditations, as the position in the
THESR changed for 56 universities while they are partners of SBE (about 37% of the
sample – this also includes institutions appearing in or disappearing from the list of
the top 200).
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the institutions in the sample. The last
three variables in Table 2 are dummy variables: their value is either 1 (if the statement
is true) or 0 (if not). The median partner university has approximately 18,000 students,
was established at the beginning of the last century and it is located in a city with al-
most half million inhabitants. The standard deviation values reported in Table 1 suggest
that the variability in the sample is high with respect to these characteristics. A signifi-
cant share of the partners is private or located on the coast.
The data is particularly valuable for answering the question investigated in this
paper. By indicating the preferred partners students make a choice which deter-
mines where they will spend several months of their life. As a result, they are
highly motivated when filling in the form. This avoids some of the common prob-
lems with survey data (see e.g. Bertrand and Mullainhatan, 2003). Another desir-
able characteristic of this data is that it represents a choice which exhausts all
student possible choices. Exchange is compulsory, and the list of possible destina-
tions is pre-determined. Hence, students must pick a number of institutions from
a closed set of universities. This is a unique characteristic of this dataset. Most of







Host city / town
is on the coast
Institution is
private
Mean 23,484 1849.5 1,739,542 0.249 0.272
Median 17,978 1906 462,786 0 0
St. Dev. 27,061 178.3 2,665,618 0.431 0.445
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(such as going to work or remaining unemployed – see Montgomery, 2002). The
fact that the exchange period is compulsory at SBE also implies that there is no
self-selection problem of students into the exchange programme. Another advan-
tage of this dataset is that a large number of universities and business schools from
different countries are represented in the sample.
On the other hand, it is difficult to assess to what extent the results can be general-
ized. The students in the sample are all from the same home institution (SBE at
Maastricht University), however this does not mean that they are all of the same na-
tionality, as about 40% of SBE students are not Dutch (SBE, 2012). Furthermore, they
take part in an exchange programme, hence their motivations might be different from
the motivations of international students enrolling to regular programmes. The popu-
lation of exchange students is interesting in itself, however, since a substantial part of
international student mobility occurs through exchange programmes, especially in
Europe. An additional feature of this dataset is that the partner universities are se-
lected by SBE. As a result, they receive a kind of implicit accreditation by SBE. If any-
thing, this means that the effect of variables such as accreditations and rankings
should be lower than what it would be if students had chosen from a random sample
of universities.
4. Model
Modelling students’ decision to choose a particular university
Underlying the choices of the applicants there is a complex strategic game. Every
student takes into consideration her expectations about the choices of the students
who are ranked better than her. Additionally, in deciding whether to put a univer-
sity in the list of her favourite six, the student considers all combinations of the
other five universities that can be chosen and put on the application form. Hence,
it is difficult to choose an appropriate empirical specification. Subsequently the em-
pirical specification will be derived after making a number of strong assumptions.
Despite these assumptions, the advantage of starting with the model is that it pro-
vides an opportunity to think about crucial control variables. A number of tests
will be derived, allowing to assess whether the model is a good approximation
of reality.
To choose an appropriate empirical model, it is necessary to define the utility func-
tion of an individual i over the possible destinations j=1,…,J available at a given applica-
tion session (i.e. the function determining the utility that individual i obtains from
going to university j – this could be called the intrinsic utility of a destination). The
utility function is defined as an exponential function of the characteristics of the uni-
versity, with individual weights and a random component. The exponential utility func-
tion differs from the specification most commonly assumed in the literature, which is
linear in its arguments (e.g. Ordovensky, 1995; Montgomery, 2002; Drewes and
Michael, 2006)4. The exponential function has been chosen for analytical simplicity, as
in the following derivations the log of the multiplication between the utility of going to
a university and the probability of being able to attend it has been used. The inclusion
of the probability of being admitted to a university as a crucial control variable distin-
guishes this studies from the aforementioned; this is the reason for choosing an
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like monotonicity, its functional form implies risk seeking behaviour over values and
over attributes (see e.g. Abbas, 2011, for a discussion of the properties of some multi-
attribute utility functions).5
The characteristics of the destination are divided between observable education qual-
ity measures (included in the vector wjt, where t indicates the application session),
other characteristics of the institution’s location (included in the vector xjt), a university
unobservable effect (labelled aj) and a random component which is specific to each
individual-university combination (ηijt).
Uijt ¼ exp ∑Kk¼1ωiβkwkjt þ ∑Gg¼1δgxgjt þ aj þ ηijt
h i
ð1Þ
Where k=1,…,K are the observed education quality characteristics of universityj; g=1,…,G are other observed characteristics; βk and δg are parameters of the
model; and ωi is a specific weight assigned per individual i to observable educa-
tion quality characteristics.
Individual i weights this utility by the probability assigned to the likelihood that uni-
versity j is still available when it is her turn to be allocated, which is called qijt. From
student i’s point of view, the value of including university j in the list of partners (which
is called “weighted utility” in this paper) is determined by the multiplication between
its intrinsic utility and qijt. Applying a logarithmic transformation to the weighted utility
yields a linear expression (and leaves the order of preference of the individual across
universities unchanged, since it is a monotonic transformation):
vijt ¼ ∑Kk¼1ωiβkwkjt þ ∑Gg¼1δgxgjt þ γln qijt
h i
þ aj þ ηijt ð2Þ
Where vijt is log weighted utility, and γ is the weight given to the probability that j is
available when it is her turn to be allocated.6
It is assumed that the students indicate the six universities with the highest
weighted utility7 on their application form. Whether university j is chosen (or not) by
i as one of her favourite destinations depends on which other universities can be
chosen at time t (competitors of j). The weaker the competitors (the lower their
weighted utility), the higher the probability that j will be chosen by the applicant.
Hence, the distribution of weighted utility among the partners matters. Consequently
some assumptions are needed to use the latent variable framework (see for example
Greene, 2002, Chap. 23) to justify the use of logit or probit. For example, assume that
the weighted utility of the universities considered by an individual i is normally dis-
tributed. The average is allowed to vary across periods and individuals, as well as the
standard deviation. Furthermore, assume that the six universities that a student can
choose represent a constant fraction ρ of the total number of partners available at
time t. Hence, given the parameters of the normal distribution, it is possible to iden-
tify a threshold for the weighted utility of university j, above which j will be chosen by
student i. For example, if ρ is approximately equal to 5% (as it is the case in the
dataset used in this paper), then university j will be chosen if its weighted utility is
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of the universities available to student i. More generally, university j enters the list of
students i’s favourite six universities if:
vijt > μvit þ σvitϕ ρð Þ ð3Þ
Where μvit is the mean of vijt for the different alternative universities available to
individual i, σvit is its standard deviation; and φ(ρ) is the standard normal probability
distribution function. University j is chosen by individual i if:
∑Kk¼1ωiβkwkjt þ ∑Gg¼1δgxgjt þ γln qijt
h i
þ aj þ ηijt−∑Kk¼1ωiβk wkt−∑Gg¼1δgxgt−at−γln qijt
h i―
−σvitϕ ρð Þ > 0
ð4Þ
Where wkt is the average of wkj over j at a given time t, xgt is the average of xgj over j
at a given time t, at is the average of aj over j at a given time t (notice that, although aj
is assumed to be constant, its average is different for every application session), and
ln qijt
h i―
is the average of ln[qijt] over j for a given individual i.
Empirical strategy
If the individual random error term, ηijt, is normally distributed, then the previous
equation can be estimated by a probit model:
Pr Cijt ¼ 1
 








−ajt−σvitϕ ρð Þ þ aj
 
ð5Þ
Where Cijt is a dummy variable equal to 1 if individual i lists university j among herfavourite universities, and 0 otherwise; and Φ is the standard cumulative normal distri-
bution function. From the equation above, it is apparent that it is necessary to include
a number of variables in the estimation.
First of all, it is necessary to include the vectors of observed education quality
characteristics wjt; to allow for a student-specific weight of these characteristics,
the variables in wjt (i.e., accr, thes and top200) are interacted with relrank (the
relative rank of student i in the IRO’s ranking, ranging from 0 to 1) in the em-
pirical specification. Hence, it is possible to see if the observed education quality
measures are taken into consideration by the students, but also whether there are
differences between students with higher and lower grades (which are reflected in
their position in the IRO’s ranking). The vector of other observed characteristics,
xjt, and the log of the probability that university j would actually be available to
student i (ln[qijt], hereinafter lnq) must also be included. Although qijt cannot be
directly observed, it is estimated on the basis of the available data. In order to
do so, a dummy variable was generated which is equal to 1 if university j would
be available to student i (independently whether student i had actually chosen it),
and 0 otherwise. The process of generating a measure for qijt is based on
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for university j at the top of the ranking, the number of available places at uni-
versity j, squares and interactions between these variables, and a number of con-
trol variables) in order to obtain a measure of the predicted probability of j to be
available to i. More details on how this variable has been constructed are reported in
Appendix 2.
To control for the average intrinsic utility of the universities in the list, it is neces-
sary to include a set of dummy variables representing the application session in which
student i is applying. However, since the education quality variables are interacted
with the individual rankings, it is also necessary to control for the interaction between
the average values of accr, thes and top200 (which are called m_accr, m_thes, and
m_top200, respectively) in a given application session and the variable relrank. Notice
that, according to Equation (5), the coefficient of the interaction between accr (or,
equivalently, thes or top200) and relrank should be equal in value, but with opposite
signs, to the coefficient of the interaction between m_accr (or m_thes) and relrank.
This can be tested empirically. The average value of lnq must also be included as a
control variable (which is termed m_lnq), and its coefficient should be equal to the
absolute value of ln[qijt] (but with the opposite sign). The term σvitφ(ρ) is a complex
function of the rank of student i. Here, it is assumed that σvitφ(ρ) changes linearly
with relrank. Under this assumption, including the variable relrank in the estimation
is sufficient for taking the term σvitφ(ρ) into account. It is possible to predict the coef-
ficient of relrank in the empirical estimation. The effect of relrank on σvitφ(ρ) is likely
to be negative, as the most popular universities will have low probabilities of being
available for individuals at the bottom of the IRO’s ranking. As a result, their weighted
utility will be closer to the weighted utility of less popular universities. Since the effect
of σvitφ(ρ) on Cijt, according to Equation (5), is negative, the coefficient of relrank
should be positive. Hence, the econometric model offers a number of tests that can
be performed to evaluate its appropriateness. These tests can be expressed in terms
on their null hypotheses: the coefficients of accr, thes, top200, and lnq should be equal
to the opposite of the coefficients of m_accr, m_thes, m_top200, and m_lnq; and the
coefficient of relrank should be positive. If the null hypotheses are rejected, then the
model is unsatisfactory.
Finally, to estimate the effect of time-varying university characteristics while account-
ing for unobserved heterogeneity (aj), it is necessary to include university fixed-effects.
This will be done in one specification. However, in another specification the university
fixed-effects will be omitted to estimate the effect of time-constant characteristics and
to exploit the cross-university variation.
A probit model is used in this paper with and without the inclusion of dum-
mies for every university (the dummies were included to take university fixed-
effects into account). As Hilmer (2001) points out, the college attendance decision
has usually been modelled by using multinomial logit models, ordered probit or
bivariate probit (in the case of modelling only the decision between enrolling to
college or not, as in Evans and Schwab, 1995). Running an ordered probit instead
of an ordinary probit does not affect the results. Studies using multinomial (or
nested) logit models are usually applied to a smaller set of choices than in this
paper. The reason can be either that the number of alternatives is small (e.g.
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types of higher education institution); or because a small, random sub-sample of
national universities is taken (Montgomery, 2002). In this paper, using a simpler
model allows considering the full sample of international universities available to
the students (which range from approximately 100 to 150, depending on the ap-
plication session) and to exploit the time dimension of the dataset by using
fixed-effects techniques.
5. Empirical estimation
Table 3 presents the results of the probit (with and without university fixed-effects)
computed on the basis of the empirical model presented in the preceding section.
For every variable and every model, the coefficient and, in brackets, the robust
standard error (clustered by university) are reported. The first column reports the
results of the first probit regression (Model 1), where all variables listed in Appendix
1 appear as regressors (with the exception of avp, which is used in the calculation
of the measure for qijt). The second column reports the results of the regression in-
cluding university fixed effects (Model 2). In both models, the econometric specifi-
cation passes all five tests derived at the end of Section 4, since none of the null
hypotheses can be rejected at a 10% confidence level. The coefficient for lnq (the
log of the probability of university j to be available to student i) is positive and sig-
nificantly different from 0 in both models. However, it seems rather low in magni-
tude, being equal to approximately 0.03 in the model without fixed-effects and 0.07
in the other model. This could be due to a low weight assigned by the student to
the probability that an institution is available, or to a severe downward bias due
measurement error.
The large number of variables included in Model 1 is likely to generate
multicollinearity, so that many coefficients are not significant “(especially for the
xjt vector which contains the variables not directly related to educational quality –
the correlation between the variables used is reported in Table 6, within Appendix
3). Nonetheless, the coefficients of variables like distance from the equator and
GNI per capita in the host country reach statistical significance, and have the
expected sign (students prefer richer and warmer places). Among the regional
dummies, the only significant ones are for Central Europe (which is negative, per-
haps because places in Central Europe are too close to Maastricht to be attractive
to SBE students) and North America (which is also negative – the reference cat-
egory is UK-Ireland). In terms of languages, only the coefficient for French is sig-
nificantly different from 0 at a 10% confidence level. Interpreting this coefficient is
difficult, as it could indicate that not many students want to learn French, or it
could pick up the effects of other characteristics of French-speaking countries. The
coefficients of the variables referring to the characteristics of the institution itself
(private, students, and foundation) are not significant at a 10% confidence level,
not even jointly.
The only two location characteristics that can be included in the fixed-effects model
are GNI per capita and price level of the host country. Once university fixed-effects
are controlled for, the sign of the coefficient of GNI per capita is reverted, and the co-
efficient is not significant anymore. Notice, however, that GNI per capita must be
Table 3 Results of the regressions
Model 1 Model 2
accr 0.27* (0.055) 0.097 (0.072)
accrank −0.19* (0.075) −0.19* (0.074)
m_accrank −0.53 (0.61) −0.75 (0.63)
thes −0.0023* (0.00077) −0.0036* (0.0012)
thesrank 0.0065* (0.0013) 0.0065* (0.0014)
m_thesrank −0.023* (0.011) −0.027* (0.012)
top200 0.0043 (0.071) −0.011 (0.073)
top200rank −0.00018 (0.00036) −0.00017 (0.00035)
m_ top200rank 0.000052 (0.0012) −0.00038 (0.0013)
graderequisite −1.3* (0.14) −1.3* (0.11)
new 0.15 (0.077) −0.0046 (0.056)
lnq 0.031* (0.013) 0.074* (0.01)
m_lnq 0.008 (0.038) −0.036 (0.036)
relrank 3.4 (2.4) 4.3 (2.5)
pricelevel 0.16 (0.3) −0.49 (0.34)



















application round fixed effects Yes Yes
university fixed effects No Yes
Nr. of observations 306580 303649
% of correctly predicted successes 13.3% 18.9%
a. * indicates significance at the 5% level.
b. In the fixed-effects specification there are 2931 less observations, as 6 universities have been dropped because the
time-constant fixed-effect predicts the failure perfectly (i.e., 6 universities have never been chosen).
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level in Model 1. The price level coefficient has the expected negative sign, but is not
significant at a 5% confidence level.
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GPA of the applicant has a large, negative impact on the dependent variable. In these
instances the results imply that the average probability of for a university to be chosen
by a student decreases by 96-97% (depending on the model). Whether a university is
new on the list of partners, on the contrary, has no significant effect on the probability
that it is chosen. This is somewhat surprising, as one might expect that a new univer-
sity would suffer a penalty because it cannot be recommended by students who went
on the exchange in preceding years.
According to both models, accreditations and the position of an institution in the
THESR have a positive effect of the probability of choosing a university for students
with high academic achievement. However, the effect of accreditations, when univer-
sity fixed-effects are included, is not significantly different from 0 (its p-value is 18%).
The effect is lower for students who are not ranked at the top of the IRO’s ranking,
and it is (surprisingly) negative for students at the bottom of the ranking. To under-
stand the implied magnitude of the coefficients in the two models, Table 4 reports the
average of the estimated effect of gaining an accreditation or improving by one pos-
ition in the THESR for a student ranked in the top, median or lowest position in the
IRO’s ranking (the effect of being included in the THESR top 200, as displayed by
Table 3, is not substantial, hence it has not been reported). The figures in Table 4
have been computed as the average predicted percentage change (across all eligible
universities) of the probability to be chosen by a student in a particular position in
the IRO’s ranking. According to Model 2, a university increases its probability to be
chosen by the “best SBE student” by 24% (from 5.1 to 8.5%) by gaining an accredit-
ation, and by 0.8% by improving its standing in the THESR by one position. The in-
crease of the probability to be chosen by the median student is rather modest,
however, and is negative for the lowest-ranked student. The effects estimated with
Model 1 are larger (or closer to 0, if negative) for accreditations, but less positive for
the THESR.11
An interesting question is whether the inclusion of university fixed-effects significantly
increases the ability of the model to predict the outcome of students’ choice. Testing
whether this is the case is not straightforward, however, as the two models presented in
Table 3 are not nested in each other. To run the test, a measure of correctly predicted out-
comes was generated. First, the predicted probabilities were computed according to the
two models. Subsequently the available partner institutions were ranked according to their
predicted probability of being indicated among the favourites for each applicant. The uni-
versities with the highest predicted probability for each applicant were classified as “pre-
dicted success”.12 The other observations were classified as “predicted failures”. Combining
this information with the actual choices of the students, it is possible to compute the num-
ber of correctly predicted successes (observations for which the dependent variable takesTable 4 Average increase of the probability that a university is chosen by a student in
the top, median, or bottom position in the IRS student ranking in percent
accr – Model 1 accr – Model 2 thes – Model 1 thes – Model 2
1st 75.3% 24.0% 0.5% 0.8%
Median 44.9% 1.0% −0.2% 0.1%
Last 19.7% −17.6% −0.9% −0.6%
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number of wrong predictions. With this information, it is possible to run a
Pearson’s Chi Square test to ascertain whether the two models are significantly dif-
ferent from each other in terms of predictive power, and whether they differ from
a hypothetical model which includes only a constant (random prediction). Model 1
differs significantly from the random-prediction model at any conventional confi-
dence level (χ2(1)=2287), and Model 2 in turn differs significantly from Model 1
(χ2(1)=484).13 In Table 3 the share of correctly predicted successes is reported as a
measure of fit. For a random prediction, this measure takes a value of 5.1% (equal
to the proportion of successes in the sample). The two models reported in Table 3
score substantially better, correctly predicting 13.3% and 18.9% of successes.
6. Conclusions
This paper analyses the determinants of international exchange students’ choices of
possible destination for their study period abroad. The focus of the paper is on available
measures of education quality in international higher education: the professional ac-
creditations for business schools, AACSB and EQUIS, and the Times Higher Education
Supplement Ranking (THESR). The data has been made available by Maastricht Uni-
versity School and Business and Economics (SBE).
The results indicate that factors related both to the quality of education (profes-
sional accreditations and international rankings) and to characteristics of the univer-
sity location (e.g. being on the coast, proximity to the Equator) affect students’
choices, even when controlling for university fixed-effects (although the effect of pro-
fessional accreditations in this case is not significant at a 5% confidence level). How-
ever, the estimated effect is not the same across all students, being positive for
students with high academic achievement, and negative for students with low aca-
demic achievement.
The average effect of accreditations and rankings is large at the top of the student
distribution, even when controlling for fixed effects: an accreditation increases the
probability of a university to be chosen by 24%, and an improvement in the THESR by
one position by 0.8%. However, the effect on the median student is very small (1% and
0.1%, respectively), and the estimated effect becomes negative for the students with the
lowest academic achievement (−18% and −0.6%).
These findings apply directly to the preferences of international exchange students,
which (at least in Europe) constitute a substantial part of the overall student mobility. The
results partly confirm what one would expect based on human capital theory and on the
fact that the exchange period is an important time in an individual’s development of profes-
sional and inter-personal skills: students prefer schools which are expected to offer good
quality education. As suggested by previous research, other characteristics of the destin-
ation also play an important role. However, the fact that rankings and accreditations have a
negative effect on the probability of a university to be chosen by students with low grades
requires an explanation. It may be that students with low grades self-select into institutions
with lower academic standards. Alternatively, it could be that students with low grades per-
ceive that the probability of finding a place in an institution offering an education of good
quality is lower than it can be predicted on the basis of available data (so that a negative ef-
fect of rankings and accreditation is found even after controlling for probability).
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standing in international rankings, their institution becomes more appealing to top
international students. The effect of accreditations on attracting top students also ap-
pears large, but conclusions cannot be reached at the same confidence level. Implica-
tions are less clear for policy makers. Professional accreditations and international
rankings can be seen as a means to reduce students’ uncertainty over the quality of for-
eign institutions and, as a result, to facilitate student mobility. Student mobility, in turn,
is a useful tool for a number of policy objectives which are given high priority in the
European area, such as labour mobility and cultural integration. However, the signal
sent by international rankings and accreditations does not appear relevant for all stu-
dents. In order to stimulate international mobility among students with below-average
academic achievement, it might be necessary to look for more effective tools.
Endnotes
1 The IRO files only report the grade requirements for each university and the GPA
for a number of students. One problem is that for most semesters, there is no informa-
tion on students’ GPA unless this was higher than 7.5. In order to have a measure of
GPA for students for whom this variable cannot be observed directly, a predicted value
was computed. The student’s GPA was regressed on a quartic function of relrank, a fall
semester dummy and a time trend, using observations from the three semesters for
which the GPA is available for all students (spring 2005, fall 2007, and spring 2008),
obtaining R^2=91%. Then the missing observations for GPA were substituted by the
predicted values based on this regression. Note further that about 90% of universities
do not impose any grade requirement, and that the fact that a partner institution may
have a grade requirement higher than the GPA of the student does not prevent the stu-
dent to name that university as one of her favourites.
2 An arbitrary value of 200 was used if a university did not appear in the first 200 po-
sitions of the ranking. Since a dummy had been included indicating whether a univer-
sity appears among the top 200 or not, the arbitrary value which is chosen is irrelevant
in estimating the coefficient of the variable thes.
3 Student numbers, for example, were collected according to the submission by the
university to Quacquarelli Sismond (2009), or to the university website, and not col-
lected for each year.
4 Oosterbeek et al. (1992) assume the utility of attending a university to be linear in
the log of the only university characteristic included in the model (future expected
wage), which is similar to the assumption of an exponential utility function made here.
5 As an alternative, a multiplicative function of the Cobb-Douglas type could have
been used. However, it would not have been possible to work with logs, as many empir-
ical variables can take the value 0.
6 A benchmark value for γ could be 1. This would mean that a university’s weighted
utility is equal to the intrinsic value of the university times the probability that the student
would be allocated a place there. However, the weight the student assigns to qijt is likely to
be lower, since not obtaining a place at a specific university does not entail that the stu-
dent obtains zero utility (she could be allocated to another university in the list, or she
may receive a good allocation even after all other students have been allocated). For ex-
ample, consider a student who has a satisfactory option among the partner institutions,
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http://www.izajoels.com/content/2/1/5with a very high probability of having available places left. This student could choose the
other universities in the list regardless of the probability of available spaces, since she is
already sure of achieving an acceptable outcome (see also Endnote 7).
7 This assumption cannot hold exactly. It can be shown that a risk-neutral student
would mention the university with maximum weighted utility among her favourite six,
but would not necessarily choose all six universities with the highest weighted utility
(in some cases, a risk-neutral student might choose universities with very high intrinsic
utility despite a relatively low weighted utility).
8 The (average) share of universities listed by applicants among the favourite six
across all ten application sessions included in the analysis ranges from 4.5% to 6.5%,
with an average of 5.1% and without specific trends.
9 The interpretation of interaction effects in logit and probit models present some
challenges (e.g. Chunrong and Norton, 2003) which this paper does not deal with. The
reason is that the interest in this study lies in the effect of the variable contained in the
vectors wjt and xjt, and not in the interaction effect in itself.
10 Accounting for fixed effects by including dummies can be problematic when using
probit, because the number of variables included becomes too large relative to the
number of observations (see Greene, 2002, Chap. 23). In this case, this is not a prob-
lem, since there are 152 universities in the sample, and 306,580 observations.
11 The effects reported in Table 4 are estimated under the assumption that an EQUIS
or an AACSB accreditation have the same effect. It is possible to estimate the two ef-
fects separately, and the results point to a stronger effect of the AACSB accreditation.
However, these estimates are based on a very small number of universities which actu-
ally changed their accreditation status while being SBE partners, as noted in Section 3.
For this reason, they are not reported in this paper.
12 Usually, an applicant chooses six universities. In that case, the six universities with
the highest predicted probability for that applicant are classified as predicted success.
Applicants are allowed to list fewer than six universities, and in some cases they do. In
that case, the number of universities equal to the number of universities listed by the
student were classified as predicted success.
13 These statistics seem unusually high. However, the p-values generated by the test
compare well to those of a Wald test for restrictions that can be tested both with a
Wald test and with the test used in this paper.
Appendix 1
In order to account for the relationship between the partner institutions and SBE (e.g.
whether they have been partners before, or whether the partner institutions requires SBE
to send only students with a minimum GPA) and for characteristics of the partner institu-
tions and their locations (e.g. number of students in the university, or price level in the host
country) a number of variables have been collected from various sources. The variable
names, together with a short description and the data sources, are reported in Table 5.
Appendix 2
Constructing qijt
The probability that a university j is actually available to student i (i.e., there are still
places left at that university when it is the turn of student i to be allocated) is a crucial
Table 5 Variables definition and sources
Variable Description / source
C Dummy (=1 if the observation corresponds to a university which has been chosen by the student) / Based on SBE data
accr =1 if the institution has one accreditation, either AACSB or EQUIS; =2 if it has both; =0 otherwise / Based on AACSB data (received by email on request) and
university websites
thes Position of the institution in the latest THESR (for every year, rank is set equal to 200 if the institution does not appear among the 200 top-ranked institutions) /
Based on THES (2010)
top200 Dummy (=1 if the institution has been ranked in the top 200 in the latest THESR)
avp Available places at the institution in the relevant application session / Based on SBE data
relrank Relative position of the student in the IRO’s ranking / Based on SBE data
graderequisite Dummy (=1 if grade requisite of university j > GPA of university i, as predicted through an OLS regression) / Based on SBE data
new Dummy (=1 if the institution appears in the partner list for the first time) / Based on SBE data
coast Dummy (=1 if host city / town is located on the coast) / Based on National Geographic (2012)
pop Population of the host city / town in 2007 or nearest year / UNESCO (2007) for towns / cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants; World Gazetteer (2009) otherwise
foundation Year of foundation of the institution / Universities’ websites
latitude Latitude of the host city / town (absolute value) / Based on National Geographic (2012)
students Number of students at the institution in most recent year available / QS Ltd (2009); universities’ website when missing
english Dummy (=1 if the institution is located in an English-speaking region)
spanish Dummy (=1 if the institution is located in a Spanish-speaking region)
french Dummy (=1 if the institution is located in a French-speaking region)
internetusers Internet users per 100 people in the host country / World Bank (2012); Central Intelligence Agency (CIA 2009) for Taiwan
pricelevel Price level in the host country relative to the US / World Bank (2012); Taiwanese Council for Economic Planning and Development (TCEPD) (TCEPD 2009) for Taiwan
gni GNI per capita at PPP / World Bank (2012); Taiwanese Council for Economic Planning and Development (TCEPD) (TCEPD 2009) for Taiwan
private Host institution is private / university websites
asiapacific Dummy (=1 if the institution is located in Asia, excl. Turkey, or Oceania, excl. Australia and New Zealand)
aus-nz-sa Dummy (=1 if the institution is located in Australia, New Zealand or South Africa)
centraleurope Dummy (=1 if the institution is located in Central Europe – Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Switzerland, excl. towns located on the Mediterranean coast)
easterneurope Dummy (=1 if the institution is located in Eastern Europe – Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland)
latinamerica Dummy (=1 if the institution is located in Latin America)
mediterraneaneurope Dummy (=1 if the institution is located in Mediterranean countries – France for towns located on the Mediterranean coast, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Turkey)
northamerica Dummy (=1 if the institution is located in Canada or US)
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the basis of the available data.
First of all, it is possible to know whether a given university j would be available to
student i, had she chosen it. This is because the ranking of students is known, as is the
institution to which each student is allocated and the number of available places at each
institution. As a result, a dummy variable can be generated which is equal to 1 if uni-
versity j is available to student i, and to 0 otherwise. The first step in the process of
generating a measure of qijt is to regress this dummy variable (called Rijt) on a number
of covariates to obtain a measure of the predicted probability of j to be available to i.
So, for each individual i the following equation is estimated:




Where the parameters π0i and πhi, h=1,…,H, are student-specific and the university-
specific regressors (D1jt,…,Dhjt) include: the share of students, among those occupying the
top 40 positions of the IRO’s ranking, listing university j as their favourite two universities
(a measure of demand at the top of the distribution, called top402); its square; the avail-
able places at university j at time t (avpjt), and their square; the multiplication between
avp and top402; accr, thes, latitude and pricelevel; and a set of dummy variables indicating
the macro-region where university j is located (see Appendix 1; all dummies for European
regions where condensed to a dummy which is equal to 1 if the university is European, to
reduce the total number of variables in the model). A linear probability model was used
because the dependent variable (Rijt) is constant (equal to 1) for a number of top-ranked
students. Hence, using a logit or probit model would have eliminated a number of obser-
vations. One regression was run for every student in the sample, for a total of 2,970 re-
gressions. The average R squared is 47%. The predicted value of Rijt according to this
regressions can be used as a measure for qijt. Note that the predicted value of Rijt varies
across students (as the parameters in the estimated equation are student-specific) and
across universities (as the regressors are university-specific). However, it is not always
positive. This implies that it is not possible to take the log of qijt, as required by Equation
(5). Hence, as a second step of the procedure, a logistical regression of Rijt over its pre-
dicted values was run, and the predicted probability on the basis of this regression was
used as a measure of qijt.
The variable top402 has been chosen because students in the first positions of the IRO’s
ranking are likely to choose the first universities in their list without strategic consider-
ations related to their probability of actually being available. This avoids introducing
endogeneity in the measure of qijt and, as a result, in the estimation of Equation (5).
Choosing different variables as the regressors in the first step of the procedure does
not affect the results that have been presented substantially. Using the fitted values of
the first step as a proxy for ln[qijt] in the estimation of Equation (5) does not affect the
results substantially either.
Appendix 3
Estimating precisely the coefficients of the variables used in the empirical estimation is
sometimes difficult, because of the collinearity between some of these variables. In Table 6,
the correlation between the variables used in the estimation (with the exception of
Table 6 Correlation among the variables used in the estimations
accr accrank m_accrank thes thesrank m_thesrank new graderequisite lnq m_lnq relrank gni pricelevel Internet users coast pop private established latitude
accr 1.000
accrank 0.775 1.000
m_accrank 0.027 0.407 1.000
thes −0.189 −0.144 −0.023 1.000
thesrank −0.098 0.207 0.742 0.509 1.000
m_thesrank −0.014 0.377 0.927 0.009 0.800 1.000
new −0.065 −0.048 0.025 −0.016 0.005 0.010 1.000
graderequisite 0.022 0.048 0.089 −0.140 −0.047 −0.049 −0.019 1.000
lnq −0.179 −0.312 −0.320 0.207 −0.206 0.413 −0.006 −0.027 1.000
m_lnq 0.046 −0.262 −0.643 −0.037 −0.664 0.830 0.000 0.066 0.497 1.000
relrank 0.002 0.361 0.887 −0.001 0.709 −0.886 0.000 0.089 −0.340 −0.683 1.000
gni 0.241 0.181 0.029 −0.272 −0.150 0.025 −0.067 −0.032 0.019 0.077 0.003 1.000
pricelevel 0.109 0.082 0.027 −0.071 −0.048 0.021 −0.034 −0.052 0.254 0.059 0.002 0.666 1.000
internetusers 0.155 0.116 0.036 −0.207 −0.121 0.028 −0.092 −0.030 0.075 0.090 0.003 0.806 0.683 1.000
coast 0.107 0.088 0.009 −0.229 −0.108 −0.010 0.053 0.028 −0.265 −0.010 0.000 0.091 −0.027 0.022 1.000
pop 0.004 0.006 0.016 −0.177 −0.088 0.002 0.032 0.075 −0.252 0.014 0.001 −0.379 −0.572 −0.354 0.232 1.000
private 0.027 0.022 0.006 0.242 0.123 0.004 0.007 −0.015 −0.013 0.007 0.000 −0.060 −0.138 −0.091 −0.156 0.150 1.000
established 0.252 0.196 −0.007 0.104 0.046 0.010 0.056 0.044 −0.161 0.010 0.000 −0.037 −0.175 −0.065 0.140 0.187 0.230 1.000
latitude −0.138 −0.106 −0.005 0.156 0.081 −0.007 −0.044 −0.064 0.377 −0.012 −0.001 0.228 0.660 0.423 −0.255 −0.523 −0.185 −0.281 1.000
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reported. The high correlation between, for example, gni and internetusers, or pop and
latitude, can make it difficult to estimate the respective coefficients precisely.
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